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This essay illustrates how our interest in questions of constitutional doctrine 
makes it difficult to assess structural arguments about judicial authority.  In the past forty 
years, we have witnessed a shift in American constitutional theory.   Scholars once 
assessed judicial authority based on their expectations of how judges should decide cases.  
In time, many concluded that discretion is an inevitable consequence of constitutional 
interpretation and therefore sought to justify such authority.  
This shift has led some scholars to give greater emphasis to structural arguments.  
They identify institutional virtues that explain the judiciary’s role in a well ordered 
government.  Although these scholars are less concerned than their predecessors with 
how judges should interpret the Constitution, many retain the doctrinal focus of the 
earlier generation.  This essay identifies problems that follow from this focus.     
Section I traces the evolution in Ronald Dworkin’s approach to questions of 
judicial authority.  Dworkin’s work provides a notable example of how doctrinal claims 
become entangled with structural arguments and confuse our assessment of judicial 
authority.  Section II contrasts Dworkin with scholars who have made claims in which 
the doctrinal and structural aspects are more readily distinguished.  Section III examines 
the First Things Symposium, in which prominent conservative scholars attack the kind of 
judicial activism that Dworkin justifies.  But the Symposiasts assess judicial authority 
from the same doctrinal perspective as Dworkin and provide a vivid illustration of how 
doctrinal controversies obscure structural arguments. Section IV concludes the essay by 
examining implications this analysis has for debates in constitutional theory.  
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American constitutional theory encompasses at least three overlapping debates.  
First, scholars argue about what the Constitution means.  They consider different theories 
of constitutional interpretation, theories that identify the values we seek to advance 
through the Constitution.  These include the substantive values expressed in particular 
provisions, such as the First Amendment’s commitments to freedom of expression and 
religion, as well as structural values that are reflected in the design of the Constitution 
itself, such as commitments to checking power, democratic elections and privacy.   
Second, scholars argue about who has authority to say what the Constitution 
means, whether it be judges or elected officials or some combination of the two.  This 
debate interlocks with the first.   On the one hand, the question of who has authority to 
interpret the Constitution is itself a question of constitutional interpretation.  On the other 
hand, our answer would to some extent depend on the institutional structure we thought 
best suited for interpreting the Constitution. 
Finally, scholars argue about the values, both substantive and structural, that we 
should advance through constitutional law.  This debate considers the Constitution from 
an external perspective.  It overlaps with the other two in that scholars identify values that 
might be advanced through our interpretation of the Constitution.  But the reasons to 
support these values do not follow from an understanding of the Constitution itself, and 
unlike the other debates, this one is not about how to interpret the Constitution.  Indeed, it 
might indicate reforms necessary to strengthen our system of constitutional government.   
3The third debate includes structural claims that have become increasingly 
important in constitutional theory.  They are different from the more familiar class of 
structural claims that speak to the values we should advance when we interpret 
Constitution.1 These claims, by contrast, identify vices and virtues of different 
institutional arrangements.2 They examine the consequences that follow from the way 
judicial and elected institutions go about resolving controversies.  It is easy to 
underestimate the significance of these claims, however, because they are far removed 
from the questions of constitutional interpretation that are central to the other debates.  
This essay contends that constitutional theorists have tended to focus on those debates 
and thus have had difficulty identifying and assessing these structural claims.   
The essay first examines the evolution in Ronald Dworkin’s approach to 
questions of judicial authority.  Dworkin’s work exemplifies a shift in constitutional 
theory in which scholars give greater emphasis to structural claims.  It also illustrates 
how easily these claims can become entangled with doctrinal arguments and thereby 
confuse our assessment of judicial authority.   
The essay then turns to the First Things Symposium, which was subsequently 
published as The End of Democracy?3  The Symposium addresses a wide range of issues 
relating to how citizens should respond to Supreme Court decisions they believe outside 
of the Court’s legitimate authority.  In developing a strategy to overturn these holdings, 
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4the Symposiasts attack the kind of judicial activism that Dworkin justifies and, in the 
process, make claims concerning the appropriate scope of judicial power.  Nonetheless, 
the Symposiasts assess judicial authority from the same doctrinal perspective as Dworkin 
and provide a particularly vivid illustration of how doctrinal controversies obscure 
structural arguments. 
The Symposiasts suggest an important structural claim against expansive judicial 
authority: that a Court empowered with judicial review will promote instability, because 
the exercise of judicial review tends to inflame political conflict. Judicial decisions 
sometimes create unfair presumptions in favor of disputed conceptions of constitutional 
values.  These presumptions make it harder for citizens to advance opposing 
interpretations of the Constitution, even though disagreements about what the 
Constitution means remain political issues.  Therefore, rather than helping the political 
community get past particularly divisive social controversies, judicial decisions lead 
people to pursue their disagreements with greater intensity.   This claim, however, is not 
developed and lost in the glare of the Symposiasts’ doctrinal arguments.  
What is more, the Symposium illustrates how a concern to advance a conception 
of constitutional doctrine makes it easy to ignore structural arguments pertaining to the 
interests of actual litigants. The Judiciary’s role in deciding particular cases is in tension 
with its role in resolving our disagreements about what the Constitution means. By 
focusing on how judges should resolve these disagreements, we risk ignoring the 
difficulties that an uncertain law imposes on those whose lives depend on how judges 
decide these cases.  A judge who decides cases with an eye toward advancing a 
conception of constitutional law will disregard the interests of litigants whose legitimate 
claims interfere with that goal.   
5Section I illustrates how Dworkin assesses judicial authority in light of his 
understanding of what constitutional doctrine should be.  Section II contends that 
Dworkin’s doctrinal orientation informs different claims he makes about judicial 
authority.  These include a structural claim that has doctrinal implications, and these 
implications make it impossible to disentangle the structural and doctrinal aspects of the 
claim.  Although Dworkin’s claims are typical of many arguments in constitutional 
theory, we will see that some scholars have made structural claims in which the doctrinal 
and structural aspects are more readily distinguished.  Section III uses the Symposiasts’ 
disagreement with Dworkin to explain why scholars with a doctrinal orientation are less 
likely to give adequate consideration to such structural claims.  It contends that: (1) these 
scholars often use structural claims to advance a doctrinal agenda and consequently do 
not consider structural claims as having independent weight; (2) this problem is 
exacerbated because structural claims often have doctrinal aspects, and scholars with a 
doctrinal orientation are likely to focus on these aspects; and (3) scholars with this 
orientation tend to see the Court’s role in resolving particular cases as only a component 
of its role in the process that identifies constitutional values.  They do not consider that 
the Court’s performance of one role might undercut its performance of the other and thus 
ignore structural claims that pertain to the former role.  Section IV concludes the essay by 
examining implications this analysis has for debates in constitutional theory, in particular 
for the question of the appropriate extent of judicial authority.  
 
I. Dworkin and Justification: Justice, Doctrine and Judicial Authority 
 This section examines Dworkin’s justification of expansive judicial authority. He 
believes such authority increases the likelihood that constitutional doctrine will satisfy 
6norms of justice.  Much of Dworkin’s work flows from the notion that people ought to be 
treated with equal concern and respect.4 This understanding underlies the attack on legal 
positivism that made his early reputation5 and also the alternative conception of law that 
he defends, what Dworkin calls law as integrity.6 It leads Dworkin to assess political 
institutions based on the respect people are owed as individuals and thus explains why he 
focuses on the particular decisions political institutions should make.  His work in 
constitutional theory extends this doctrinal orientation: he defends judicial review 
because he expects that judges will make better decisions than legislators regarding the 
conditions necessary to secure equal status for citizens.7
Consider first how the idea of equal concern and respect informs his attack on 
legal positivism and his association of law with the virtue of integrity.  While positivists 
sought to distinguish law and morality by showing that we could conceptualize law 
without making any claims about morality, Dworkin sought to establish that morality was 
integral to law, because we advance a conception of fairness when we resolve social 
controversies based on pre-established standards.8 Law, according to Dworkin, justifies 
and limits the state’s use of coercion by making its use contingent on—and consistent 
with—past political decisions that define people’s rights and responsibilities.9
Dworkin believes that by separating law and morality the positivists cannot address 
adequately an important jurisprudential problem, namely people’s obligation to obey 
judge made law.10 He explains our obligation to obey judicial decisions in “hard cases,” 
4
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7cases in which existing legal sources provide no clear standard to ground a decision.11 
Dworkin contends that judicial decisions should extend and clarify the principles of 
justice manifest in the political community’s past practices.  Such decisions treat citizens 
with the concern and respect necessary to make their compliance obligatory.12 
The notion that we use law to justify the exercise of political authority also 
underlies Dworkin’s conception of law as integrity.13   He defends law as integrity as an 
account of judicial practice.  He contends that it fits our understanding of what judges do 
and that it presents the practice in its best light.14 Dworkin believes that a state 
strengthens its claim to legitimacy when judicial decisions exhibit the virtue of integrity.  
Integrity “. . . requires government to speak with one voice, to act in a principled and 
coherent manner toward all its citizens, to extend to everyone the substantive standards of 
justice or fairness it uses for some.”15 Dworkin claims that by applying its principles 
with integrity, a community exhibits mutual concern, what he considers the hallmark of a 
community in which citizens have an obligation to obey political authority.16 
Dworkin contrasts this conception of law with rivals that fail to generate mutual 
concern, because they either ignore past decisions or are bound too rigidly to them.17 His 
defense of integrity, thus, extends the doctrinal focus of his earlier work.  Indeed, 
Dworkin dedicates nearly a third of Law’s Empire to illustrations of how judges should 
11 Id. at 81-130. 
12 DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 93. 
13 Id. at 96-98.
14 Id. at 176-224.
15Id. at 165.  Dworkin considers integrity a virtue that is distinct from justice and fairness. 
16Id. at 191-2, 98-202, 211, 213-14. His argument rests on the assumption that political legitimacy depends 
on citizens having a general obligation “to obey political decisions that purport to impose duties on them.”  
He concludes that “. . . a state that accepts integrity as a political ideal has a better case for legitimacy than 
one that does not.”   
17Id. at 198-202, 211, 213-14. 
8interpret legal principles to advance integrity and promote the conditions necessary to 
sustain their authority.18 
In Freedom’s Law, Dworkin builds from the argument in Law’s Empire to defend 
an expansive conception of judicial authority.  He contends that judicial review can be 
justified as consistent with norms of democratic government, if it increases the likelihood 
that a political community would treat citizens with equal concern and respect.19 It 
would do so by securing for citizens genuine membership in the political community.20 
This notion of genuine membership connects Dworkin’s justification of judicial review to 
his conception of law as integrity.  Judicial authority is justified if judges reach decisions 
that promote integrity.   
Judicial decisions, according to this view, should reflect the best interpretation of 
the political community’s principles of justice, and judges should extend these principles 
to all applicable contexts.21 It is not surprising, therefore, that he again spends 
considerable time describing how judges should decide cases.  He presents Freedom’s 
Law as an exercise in interpreting principles of American constitutional law in light of 
the virtue of integrity.22 
Throughout his career, Dworkin’s belief that citizens should be treated with equal 
concern and respect leads him to focus on constitutional doctrine.  We can identify at 
18Id. at 167, 276-399.  
19 DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 17.  Dworkin takes the “defining aim of democracy to be . . .: that collective 
decisions be made by political institutions whose, structure, composition, and practices treat all members of 
the community, as individuals, with equal concern and respect.”  
20Id. at 23, 25-26 Dworkin believes that the political community must satisfy three conditions to secure 
genuine membership: (1) each citizen must have an opportunity to influence collective decisions; (2) the 
interests of each citizen must be considered equally in assessing the consequences of any collective 
decision; and (3) the political community respects the moral independence of citizens—its authority to 
resolve moral disputes among citizens does not entail the authority to force citizens to embrace particular 
moral views. 
21Id. at 10-11, 83.  
22Id. at 2, 10-11, 34-35, 37-38. 
9least three distinct claims that assess judicial authority based on whether judicial 
decisions advance equality. To sharpen the distinction, we frame the claims in terms of
Brown v. Board of Education of Education23, a case that Dworkin believes integral to an 
account of American judicial authority.24
(1) The decision in Brown v. Board is legitimate, because it advanced the 
Constitution’s conception of equality by interpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment as forbidding school segregation.   
 
(2) The decision in Brown v. Board illustrates how the Judiciary as an 
institution contributes to American government by promoting 
integrity.  The Court ensured equal concern and respect for African 
American citizens by extending an important principle of American 
government, equality, to a context in which it was applicable. 
 
(3) The decision in Brown v. Board suggests that an institutional structure 
that includes judicial review by an independent Court increases the 
likelihood that political institutions will exhibit the virtue of integrity 
and promote the equality among citizens suggested thereby.  
 
Moreover, we can identify a fourth claim, one that Dworkin would reject, that would 
circumscribe judicial authority notwithstanding the decision in Brown.  This claim 
assesses judicial authority in light of an understanding of equality that has no bearing on 
how judges should decide cases.  
(4) The decision in Brown v. Board advanced a compelling conception of 
equality.  But the judicial process itself cannot be characterized as 
equal, especially in comparison to the legislative process.  The judicial 
process limits the number of people who have a say about a political 
outcome and the arguments that receive a hearing before a final 
decision is made as to that outcome.  
 
The next section uses these claims to consider Dworkin’s relationship with American 
constitutional theory.  It illustrates how debates in constitutional theory have tended to 
23347 U.S. 486 (1954). 
24DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 93, 268.
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share Dworkin’s doctrinal focus. The following section then identifies negative 
consequences that follow from this focus.
II.  The Doctrinal Orientation of American Constitutional Theory   
 
Dworkin belongs to a generation of American legal scholars who came to 
maturity during the ascendance of the Warren Court.  Many of these scholars sought to 
reconcile the Court’s activism on behalf of individual rights with the preceding 
generation’s commitment to legislation as the primary vehicle for social progress.25 
Indeed, Dworkin frames his defense of expansive judicial authority as a response to his 
mentor Learned Hand, a giant of the earlier generation whose Holmes Lecture criticizing 
Brown is an important statement of that generations’ skepticism about such activism.26 
Dworkin clerked for Hand and helped prepare that lecture.27 He responds to Hand forty 
years later.  But it seems that the earlier foray into the controversy surrounding Brown
would help explain the doctrinal orientation that permeates so much of his work.   
Constitutional theorists of Dworkin’s generation share this orientation.  To a 
significant extent, debates in constitutional theory have been animated by the need to 
defend Brown v. Board.28 Alexander Bickel, for example, framed The Least Dangerous 
Branch as a response to Hand and Herbert Wechsler29—who also used the occasion of a 
Holmes Lecture to question Brown.30 Bickel introduces the term counter-majoritarian 
difficulty to describe the problem of justifying judicial review, why a non-elected 
judiciary should have authority to invalidate actions of elected institutions of 
25 See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian 
Difficulty, Part Five 112 YALE L. L. 153, 159-161 (2002).
26
 LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).
27See DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 347.
28 See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 41, 59 (1996).
29
 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
11
government.31 The counter-majoritarian difficulty became the touchstone for two 
generations of constitutional theorists, and they tended to view the problem as one of 
establishing the democratic legitimacy of Brown and other controversial Supreme Court 
decisions.32 
In their quest to solve the counter-majoritarian difficulty, constitutional theorists 
have often made claims similar to those we associated with Dworkin.  Theorists 
originally sought to identify principles that could constrain judicial discretion, and 
consequently their work shares the doctrinal focus that characterized Dworkin’s criticism 
of positivist understandings of law and his defense of law as integrity.  This focus is 
captured by claims (1) and (2).  In time, theorists moved beyond the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty and sought to justify the discretion that judges exercised.  In so doing, their 
arguments parallel Dworkin’s appeal to the virtue of integrity to justify an expansive 
conception of judicial authority, claim (3).  After examining Dworkin’s claims, we will 
identify analogs that have emerged in American constitutional theory. 
 
A.  Constitutional Values versus Institutional Virtues 
The first two claims focus on how judges should decide cases.   
(1) The decision in Brown v. Board is legitimate, because it advanced the 
Constitution’s conception of equality by interpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment as forbidding school segregation.   
 
(2) The decision in Brown v. Board illustrates how the Judiciary as an 
institution contributes to American government by promoting 
integrity.  The Court ensured equal concern and respect for African 
30
 ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 46-65 (1962).
31 Id. at 16-18
32 See Friedman, supra note 25, at 159; Keith Whittington, Constitutional Theory and the Faces of Power, 
in THE JUDICIARY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 163-65 (Kenneth D. Ward and Cecilia R. 
Castillo eds., 2005)
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American citizens by extending an important principle of American 
government, equality, to a context in which it was applicable. 
 
Both (1) and (2) appeal to equality as a value that judges should seek to advance 
as they formulate constitutional doctrine.  I refer to such values as constitutional values.  
(1) reflects Dworkin’s notion that legal decisions are authoritative when they treat people 
with equal concern and respect.  And, in this particular case, plaintiffs won a case they 
had a right to win based on the principle of equality defined by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution.33 The Court, according to Dworkin, would have 
undercut its authority, if it had allowed segregation to continue in violation of this right.34 
(2) also addresses the Court’s exercise of authority, though it appeals to a more 
abstract understanding of equality than does (1).  More significantly, (2) adds a new 
dimension: it considers whether this particular outcome is consistent with the Court’s 
other decisions about equality.  This second dimension is also a claim about equality.  It 
reflects Dworkin’s contention that judges derive authority because they promote equal 
concern and respect for citizens by extending constitutional principles to all applicable 
cases.  (2), in contrast to (1), appeals to a value that is not the immediate subject of 
adjudication.  This second dimension of equality is also captured in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s commitment to equal protection.35 But analogs of (2) need not be and 
usually are not given explicit constitutional expression.  
Nonetheless, (2) is like (1) in that judicial authority seems to depend on how 
judges decide particular cases.  This is why I characterize both claims as appealing to 
constitutional values. (3) and (4), by contrast, appeal to equality as an institutional virtue.   
33DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 389. 
34Id. at 392.
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(3) The decision in Brown v. Board suggests that an institutional structure 
that includes judicial review by an independent Court increases the 
likelihood that political institutions will exhibit the virtue of integrity 
and promote the equality among citizens suggested thereby. 
 
(4) The decision in Brown v. Board advanced a compelling conception of 
equality.  But the judicial process itself cannot be characterized as 
equal, especially in comparison to the legislative process.  The judicial 
process limits the number of people who have a say about a political 
decision and the arguments that receive a hearing before that decision 
is made.  
 
(3) is similar to (2) in that it considers judicial authority based on a higher order norm—it 
asks whether the Court increases the likelihood that our system of constitutional 
government will exhibit the virtue of integrity.  But we should answer this question 
without reference to how well judges interpret the Constitution in any particular case.   
(3) is a structural claim: it emphasizes institutional features of the Judiciary that make it 
more likely to advance integrity than a system that does not subject its legislature to as 
robust a judicial check.     
Nonetheless, (3) has a doctrinal aspect as well.  We must look at judicial decisions 
to test whether a Judiciary with the authority of judicial review increases the chances that 
our principles of government will be applied with integrity.  Dworkin makes this clear 
when he states that “[T]he best institutional structure is the one best calculated to produce 
the best answers to the essentially moral question of what the democratic conditions 
actually are, and to secure stable compliance with those conditions.”36 And we would 
reject (3), if we found that judicial decisions did not exhibit the integrity Dworkin 
believes underlies the Judiciary’s contribution to such a structure.37 
35Id. at 185.
36
 DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 34.
37Id. at 15.  Dworkin links his understandings of democratic conditions and integrity.  Democratic 
conditions in the quoted language above refers to an earlier statement that “[D]emocracy means 
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On the other hand, (3) does not require any particular adjudicative outcome.  We 
need not consider whether judges interpreted the Constitution correctly, whether they 
advanced the proper substantive understanding of equality or an understanding that is 
consistent with a higher order value.  Instead, we must determine whether the universe of 
judicial decisions increase the likelihood that our political institutions exhibit integrity.   
Our discussion of American constitutional theory will identify claims like (3) that 
are more removed from questions of constitutional doctrine.  While it is impossible to 
divorce Dworkin’s claim from an understanding of how judges should decide cases,  
other scholars associate judicial authority with virtues that depend more on how judges 
go about making decisions than on the particular decisions they make.  We will see that 
these theories fall on a continuum ranging from claims like Dworkin’s, claims in which it 
is difficult to separate their structural and doctrinal aspects, to those more similar to (4), a 
claim that is completely divorced from considerations of constitutional doctrine.  More 
significantly, Section III will illustrate how our concern for constitutional doctrine can 
obscure the structural aspects of claims like (3).   
While (4) stands out as a criticism of judicial review, we consider it in order to 
highlight the structural aspects of claims like (3).  Both (3) and (4) assess the Court’s 
authority in light of structural features of the judicial process, and consequently they do 
not depend on how judges decide particular cases.  But claims like (3) make assumptions 
about how judges actually go about deciding cases in a way that is not true of (4), which 
assigns no weight to the outcome of adjudications or even to the manner in which cases 
are adjudicated.  Indeed, (4)’s claim that adjudication systematically excludes people and 
government subject to conditions—we might call these ‘democratic’ conditions—of equal status for all 
citizens.”. 
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interests from the process of decision-making would survive, even if we were to think 
that the Judiciary would always decide cases correctly.  Jeremy Waldron employs a claim 
like (4) to argue against judicial review.38 But we will see that scholars also defend 
judicial review based on considerations that are divorced from the cases judges must 
resolve.   
This introduces a final consideration.  Although theorists can appeal to claims of 
each of these types when assessing judicial authority, the claims cannot always be 
weighed against each other.  The notion of equality advanced when we make decisions 
through particular procedures is different than the notion of equality we use to assess the 
decisions that are made.  And while it seems likely if not obvious that sometimes it is 
more important to get a decision right than it is to go about the decision in the right way, 
it is not clear when this is the case.   
 
B. The Shift from Constitutional Values to Institutional Virtues in Constitutional Theory 
We also see analogs of each of these claims in constitutional theory.  After 
Brown, many theorists sought to solve the conventional view of the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty.39 The conventional view assumes that judicial review undercuts two bases of 
democratic legitimacy. Elected institutions: (a) define values that better reflect the will of 
citizens, and (b) allow citizens to control their government. Constitutional theorists, then, 
must ground judicial authority in values that can overcome these concerns.  Judges, 
according to this view, derive authority when they interpret legal principles in a manner 
38 See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT  (1999.)
39 See Kenneth Ward, The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty and Legal Realist Perspectives of Law: The 
Place of Law in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, XVII J. LAW & POLITICS  854-60 (2002)  .  The 
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that advances values that the community endorses or should endorse and that at the same 
time limit judicial discretion. It is thought that such principles subject judges to 
something like democratic control.  
These theories resemble Dworkin’s in that judicial authority seems to follow 
when judges interpret constitutional principles correctly, and thus, judges must enforce 
the right values in order to sustain their authority.  It is this doctrinal focus that explains 
why the debate surrounding the counter-majoritarian difficulty originally gravitated 
toward claims like (1) and (2).  
Consider John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust.40 Ely criticizes various 
attempts to solve the counter-majoritarian difficulty and then joins the quest by offering 
his own solution.  Ely rejects non-originalist—what he calls non-interpretivist41--theories 
of judicial review.  These theories assign judges a lawmaking function, the power to 
enforce values not found in the text of the Constitution.42 His criticisms suggest a 
pattern.   Theorists make a claim like (3), that the judiciary has the independence, 
expertise or other structural feature necessary to advance values that elected institutions 
are ill suited to respect, and then claim judicial decisions might advance or actually have 
advanced these values, a claim analogous to (1) or (2).   
The weight of their arguments fall on the doctrinal claim, as Ely illustrates when 
he shows that non-originalists do not identify an acceptable source of values that will 
article distinguishes the conventional view of the counter-majoritarian difficulty from the view Bickel 
actually held.   
40 See ELY, supra note 1.
41I follow Paul Brest in using the term non-originalist in order to avoid the mistaken impression that non-
interpretivists do not interpret the text of the Constitution and to achieve clarity given that the primary 
critics of non-originalist judicial review call themselves originalists.  See Paul Brest, The Misconceived 
Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1979).
42ELY, supra note 1 at 1. 
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limit judicial discretion.43 Ely also defends judicial review.  He contends that judges 
should enforce certain core procedural principles that define American democracy, and 
that these principles will limit judicial discretion.44 But Ely’s critics note that his 
structural claim masks a series of doctrinal claims; Ely's approach does not in fact limit 
judicial discretion, because judges' concern for the outcome of cases will inevitably 
determine which values they try to advance.45 
More significantly, Ely's work stoked two powerful trends in constitutional 
theory, both of which focus on limiting judicial discretion and thus assess judicial 
authority based on claims like (1) and (2).  First, theorists associated with the revival of 
civic republicanism extend Ely's idea that judges should enforce principles that define the 
operation of American democracy.  They argue that judges can discover these principles 
within the wider social context in which citizens debate and define the political 
community’s values.46 The second trend is the rise of originalism.  Originalists contend 
that judicial review is only legitimate if judges enforce principles they derive from the 
ordinary meaning of the Constitution.47 
Both originalists and civic republicans, however, fail to identify principles that 
limit judicial discretion to the extent necessary to resolve the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty. As evidence of an unconstrained judiciary has mounted, many theorists have 
43Id. at 11-42. 
44Id. at101-04.
45See generally Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 
YALE L.J. 1063 (1980); ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW, 173-74 (1985); MARK V. TUSHNET, RED WHITE AND BLUE, 94-107 (1988); PAUL W. 
KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY, 149-50 (1992); STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, 160 (1996).
46See generally Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 
(1984); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the 
Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).  
47See e.g. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990); ANTONIN SCALIA, A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (Amy Gutmann ed. 1986)   
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sought to move beyond the counter-majoritarian difficulty.  Some theorists continue to 
make claims like (1) and (2) and reject judicial review based on the values they expect 
judges to advance.  Consider the surprising convergence in the work of Mark Tushnet 
and Robert Bork–theorists who are on opposite sides of the political spectrum and who 
have been associated with republicanism and originalism, respectively.48 Both conclude 
that legal principles are too indeterminate to limit judicial discretion. And each has 
argued that judicial review should be significantly curtailed, because judges will not 
advance good values.49 
Other theorists take a different tact.  They give greater emphasis to the process 
that expresses the community’s values and less to the particular values that legal 
decisions might advance.  In other words, they attempt to justify the discretion that judges 
exercise, rather than identify principles that would constrain such discretion.  They claim 
that political legitimacy attaches to the broader political process that expresses values, 
and that judges derive authority by contributing to a good process.  In so doing, they 
make claims like (3) to assert virtue in a constitutional structure that includes judicial 
review.  
We have recently been deluged by such arguments; theorists claim that judicial 
review makes the political process more deliberative, representative, just, free or that it 
advances some other important goal.50 Republicans, for example, now emphasize the 
48See BORK, supra note 47; TUSHNET, supra note 45.
49
 ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH 96-119 1996); MARK V. TUSHNET, 
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999.)
50 See e.g., SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS On What the 
Constitution Means (1984); CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL 
SELF_GOVERNMENT (2001); RICHARD H. FALLON JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION  
( 2001); STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE AND COMMUNITY IN 
LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990); TERRI PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL 
COURT (1999); MICHAEL J. PERRY, WE THE PEOPLE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND 
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role judges play within the political system, rather than the values that judges should 
advance. Bruce Ackerman and Cass Sunstein contend that judicial review is consistent 
with democratic government when that idea is properly understood, and explain how 
judges might contribute to deliberation about constitutional values.51 
Originalists have also veered from the view that judges legitimate their power by 
enforcing legal principles that constrain their discretion.  Instead, they give greater 
emphasis to how originalist interpretation follows from the institutional design of the 
Constitution.  Keith Whittington has argued that judicial review contributes to a system 
of government that makes self-government possible.52 He argues that judges undermine 
this system when they enforce constitutional principles that do not reflect the 
Constitution's original meaning.53 His approach is emblematic of theorists who tether 
originalist interpretation to considerations of why the political community governs itself 
through a written constitution.54 
These claims appeal to virtues that characterize governments with judicial review 
as opposed to the particular values that judges are likely to advance through their 
interpretations of constitutional principle. Steven Macedo, for example, contends that the 
judiciary, as an institution, respects citizens as reasonable beings, because judges must 
THE SUPREME COURT (1999); LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION 
(2001); Gerald F. Gaus, Public Reason and the Rule of Law, in NOMOS: THE RULE OF LAW 328 (Ian 
Shapiro ed., 1994)
51See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE--FOUNDATIONS (1991); CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE 
CASE AT A TIM: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999).  
52 See KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, 
ORIGINAL INTENT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999).
53Id. at 111.
54See Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism; (defending originalism as advancing the value of 
constancy and thus promoting order); Michael J. Perry, What is "the Constitution"? (and Other 
Fundamental Questions), (defending originalism as necessary to advance the Constitution's aim of 
coordinating social interaction); Jed Rubenfeld, Legitimacy and Interpretation, in Constitutionalism: 
Philosophical Foundations (linking originalist interpretation to the value of freedom) all in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS (Larry Alexander ed. 1998).   
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justify the exercise of government authority in terms that litigants can grasp.55 His 
contention depends on judges exercising their authority in a certain manner—they have to 
justify their decisions in certain terms—but it does not demand that they decide cases in a 
particular way.56 Judges, according to this view, can in some circumstances decide cases 
for either party or for opposing reasons so long as their decisions are properly justified.   
Macedo’s argument follows a path taken by scholars who tie the justification of 
judicial authority to virtues associated with the rule of law.  While Macedo associates the 
rule of law with public justification and thus the virtue of reasonability, others have 
emphasized virtues such as constancy, stability, finality and fairness.57 They contend that 
structural characteristics of Courts explain why an institutional system that includes 
judicial review will manifest the particular virtue they identify.  Their arguments justify 
judicial authority based on considerations that do no depend on the outcomes of 
particular cases.  As with Macedo’s appeal to reasonability, theorists can gauge whether 
judicial holdings are predictable, whether constitutional doctrine is stable or whether 
judicial holdings resolve controversies with finality, without any preconceived notion of 
the correct way to interpret the Constitution.  And while the structural emphasis of these 
theories lend themselves to claims about the rule of law, we see similar arguments from 
people who view the Court from a more political perspective.  Terri Peretti, for example, 
has claimed that the Judiciary contributes to an institutional structure by expanding the 
55 See MACEDO, supra note 50, at 159-62. 
56 This is only true in cases where judges can provide adequate reasons to support both sides of an issue.  
This assumption, however, appears to describe the controversial Supreme Court decisions that tend to be 
the focus of debates among constitutional theorists. 
57See Kay, supra note 54; Perry, supra note 54, “American Constitutionalism;” Larry Alexander and 
Frederick Schauer, On Extra Judicial Constitutional Interpretation 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997).
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range of interests it represents,58 and  Barry Friedman believes it provides an outlet for 
perspectives that contribute to public dialogue about constitutional values.59 
Recall our discussion suggesting that claims like (3) can bear a close relationship 
to claims like (2).  We saw that it was impossible to know that an institutional structure 
promotes integrity without also knowing what it would mean for judges to extend 
applicable principles to all cases in which they apply.  Although (3) is a structural claim, 
it is so closely related to the doctrinal claim in (2) that it is impossible to disentangle one 
from the other.  (3) seems to depend on a prior understanding of how judges should 
interpret the Constitution, in much the same way as Ely’s procedural argument masked 
substantive claims.  But scholars have defended judicial review based on arguments that 
suggest we can sustain the distinction between structural and doctrinal claims, including 
some whose claims approach (4) in their distance from the subject of adjudication.   
Macedo’s argument, for example, resembles Dworkin’s; Macedo contends that 
the judiciary is well suited to perform the reason-giving function, and we must look at 
judicial decisions to gauge how well it performs this function.  But we can determine that 
decisions are reasoned—we do not have to say that they are well reasoned or better 
reasoned then potential competitors—while making very few judgments about their 
substance.  Although we would have to look across opinions to see whether judges give 
reasons for their decisions, such analysis does not require the substantive judgments that 
would be necessary to determine whether judicial decisions advance Dworkin’s 
understanding of integrity or Ely’s understanding of democracy.  Similarly, we could 
58 See PERETTI, supra note 50, 
59 Barry Friedman, William Howard Taft Lecture: The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and 
Function of Judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. University of Cincinnati Law Review 1257, 1291, 1297-
98 (2004). 
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assess Peretti’s claim that judicial review increases the range of interests our system of 
government represents or Barry Friedman’s claim that it promotes political dialogue 
without a prior understanding of how to interpret the Constitution.   
Nonetheless, we cannot sever completely such assessments from considerations of 
constitutional doctrine.   We would have to consider whether judges give these reasons in 
good faith—whether they actually explain decisions as opposed to only being ex post 
justifications of values that judges advance for other reasons.  And we cannot assess 
Peretti’s and Friedman’s arguments without considering what it would mean to represent 
diverse interests or without some ideal of what political discourse should be.  These 
considerations would no doubt implicate substantive questions about whether certain 
decisions are reasoned, advance interests or perspectives that are underrepresented, or 
advance an ideal of political discourse. 
They do not require judgments as closely related to doctrine as those necessary to 
assess Dworkin’s claim of integrity, however.  Indeed, some approach (4) in their 
distance from the subject of adjudication.  Alexander and Schauer, for example, have 
argued that a Court empowered with judicial review is well suited to serve as a “single 
authoritative interpreter” of the Constitution and thus increases the likelihood of stable 
constitutional doctrine.60 The Court, in their view, performs a “settlement function,” 
relating to our disagreements as to what the law requires, and in performing this function, 
the Court promotes social coordination.61 While it is true that we would assess this 
argument by measuring the stability of constitutional doctrine, we would not need to 
60See Alexander and Schauer, supra note 57. 
61 Id.
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assess judicial decisions beyond a determination of how their stability compares to the 
decisions made through other institutional arrangements.62 
III. Institutional Virtues and the Distinction Between Structural and Doctrinal Claims 
This section illustrates how we clarify debates in constitutional theory by 
distinguishing the structural and doctrinal aspects of claims like (3).  Although 
constitutional theorists have relied increasingly on structural claims to justify judicial 
review, they are often secondary claims used to support important doctrinal arguments 
that remain at the center of debates in constitutional politics.  Structural claims tend to be 
obscured in the glare of debates about constitutional doctrine and therefore not given 
adequate consideration.  This problem is exacerbated because of the different aspects of 
claims like (3).  These claims magnify the doctrinal glare that already distracts our 
attention from structural considerations, and in so doing, they draw attention not only 
from the structural aspect of their claim but also from other structural claims.   
The First Things Symposia attacking judicial activism illustrates these problems.  
The Symposiasts attack Supreme Court decisions that they believe undercut the 
citizenship of religious people by delegitimizing the moral positions they assert.63 We 
will see that that the idea of delegitimization suggests at least two structural claims that 
are analogous to (3), but that these claims are obscured by the Symposiasts doctrinal 
arguments.  We will also see that this problem is magnified by the doctrinal aspect of 
these structural claims.   
62
 See TUSHNET, supra note 49, at 27-28; LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES 234 
(2004). 
63See infra, note 67.  
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Finally, the Symposium helps us to identify a tension that arises between 
structural arguments that assess the Court’s role in resolving actual controversies—
applying constitutional principles to particular contexts—and structural arguments that 
assess the Court’s role in the ongoing process that identifies constitutional values.  
Constitutional theorists tend to be more concerned about the Court’s role in identifying 
constitutional values, given the extent that debates in constitutional theory have been 
framed in terms of the counter-majoritarian difficulty.  Recall that the failure to identify 
principles that could limit judicial discretion leads theorists to justify the discretion 
judges have in the process that identifies constitutional values.  In identifying virtues that 
justify this authority, they treat the authority to resolve controversies as only a step in the 
broader process that identifies constitutional values.  In so doing, they ignore tension 
between the Court’s two roles.   
 
A. Structural Claims Obscured by Doctrinal Claims  
The distinction between doctrinal and structural claims is necessary if only to 
properly assess structural claims.  Consider the First Things Symposia attacking activist 
judicial decisions relating to abortion, homosexuality, and the place of religion in society, 
decisions that Dworkin would no doubt defend in the name of integrity.64 By comparing 
the Symposiasts to Dworkin, we can see that their disagreement is mainly about 
constitutional doctrine and substantive justice more generally.   
64 See DWORKIN, supra note 7. 
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The Symposiasts contend that the Court’s decisions: (a) introduce great injustice 
that undermines the legitimacy of the regime;65 and (b) thwart the will of the people by 
substituting the Justices views for those of elected representatives.66 But they have a third 
line of attack, one we have already mentioned: that these decisions (c) undercut the 
citizenship of religious people by delegitimizing the moral positions they assert.67 
While all three claims focus on the substance of the Court’s decisions, the third 
claim also suggests a structural argument against judicial review.  Their sense of 
delegitimization follows because the judicial process need not and, apparently, has not 
considered their views—I will sometimes use the term disenfranchisement instead of 
delegitimization, in order to emphasize an important implication of the Symposiasts’ 
argument, that the legislative process is more respectful of citizens’ views.68 
But their frustration indicates a deeper problem than a non-accountable institution 
making a decision that disrespects a view they hold intensely.  After all, there are 
political avenues to challenge judicial decisions; the Symposium itself aims to change 
constitutional doctrine—to “relegitimize” the views disfavored by the Court.  The 
problem is that the Court’s exercise of authority creates a presumption in favor of a 
certain conception of constitutional values that makes the success of such an act 
extremely unlikely.   
65
 Russell Hittinger, A Crisis of Legitimacy; Robert P. George, The Tyrant State, in THE END OF 
DEMOCRACY? THE JUDICIAL USURPATION OF POLITICS ) 27-28, and 57 ( Richard John Neuhaus 
ed., 1997).
66Robert H. Bork, Our Judicial Oligarchy; Hadley Arkes, A Culture Corrupted; and The Editors of FIRST 
THINGS, Introduction, in THE END OF DEMOCRACY? THE JUDICIAL USURPATION OF 
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 Charles W. Colsen, Kingdom in Conflic, in THE END OF DEMOCRACY? THE JUDICIAL 
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68 See WALDRON, supra note 38.
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The presumption could arise for many reasons.  It might follow from how citizens 
view the Court.  Many citizens seem to accept the Court’s determination of constitutional 
values as authoritative, because they believe the Court has special insight into the 
Constitution or simply because they are predisposed to respect what they are told are 
judgments of law.  The presumption might also follow from difficulties in using the 
legislative process to promote the views the Court delegitimizes or in navigating the 
political process available to challenge judicial interpretations of constitutional values.  
The point, however, is not to explain the presumption or even to determine whether it 
poses greater difficulties than would arise if a legislature had made similar decisions.  
The point is that we might attribute the Symposiasts’ feeling of disenfranchisement to an 
institutional structure that creates too great a presumption in favor of values endorsed by 
the Court and that such a presumption would not follow if a legislature had made the 
same decision.  We thus can view the Symposiasts’ third claim as structural. 
This structural claim is obscured by the two other arguments whose overriding 
concern is to change constitutional doctrine.  Moreover, this is a claim that has doctrinal 
and structural aspects, and it is not clear that the Symposiasts assign any weight to the 
structural aspect of the claim.  The Symposiasts might think that because the judiciary is 
an elitist institution, it is less likely to represent the interests of religious people.  This 
would suggest that we remedy the problem by either making judges respect religious 
views or, in the alternative, defer to legislatures that do.  This interpretation, like (3) that 
we associated with Dworkin, assesses the judicial institution in light of its decisions.  It 
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seems to emphasize the doctrinal aspect of the claim and thus dove-tails nicely with the 
Symposiasts’ other arguments.69 
Nonetheless, the structural aspect of this claim would survive, even if the Court 
were to reverse its decisions on these issues.  Although the Symposiasts concerns would 
be alleviated by the Court’s reversals, it is not clear that the reversals would signal that 
the institution of the judiciary is sufficiently representative.  There remains a question of 
whether the judiciary, as an institution, is well suited to represent religious views, 
whether they are the views of the Symposiasts or of those religious people who embrace 
the Supreme Court’s activism and reject the Symposiasts’ criticisms.  We should not 
allow the Symposiasts’ substantive agenda to interfere with our assessment of this 
structural aspect of their claim. 
More significantly, the idea of disenfranchisement can be interpreted to reveal a 
related structural claim, namely that judicial authority promotes political instability by 
giving people the sense that their views will not carry much weight in future deliberations 
about what the Constitution means.  Disagreements about constitutional values survive 
judicial attempts at resolution.70 Given that these disagreements extend in time, we have 
an interest in how our institutional structure manages ongoing debates about these values.   
The Symposiasts’ expression of disenfranchisement suggests that judges have 
created a presumption that makes it harder for religious people to advance their 
interpretations of the Constitution in future conflicts.  And one would expect a political 
69 And this interpretation is plausible given the strong suggestion that the crisis for American democracy 
would pass if the decisions were reversed.  Indeed, at least one Symposiast argues that we should preserve 
judicial review so that the Court can enforce the correct constitutional values.  See Hadley Arkes, Prudent 
Warning and Imprudent Reactions, in THE END OF DEMOCRACY? II A CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY 83
(Mitchell S. Muncy ed., 1999).
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community to become less stable, if citizens who dissent from judicial decisions believed 
that those decisions would hinder any attempt to advance their views.  Consequently, 
there is reason to curtail the exercise of judicial authority that increased the likelihood of 
people having this sense of disenfranchisement.   
The tone of the Symposium certainly suggests that the Symposiasts believe 
themselves the victims of such a presumption, and perhaps their anger at the Court’s 
decisions draws their attention away from flaws in our constitutional structure.  Indeed, 
one would expect that the Symposiasts erstwhile allies are better situated to grasp the 
problem of instability; they believe that the Symposiasts’ challenge threatens the stability 
of our system of constitutional government.71 And if instability arises because our 
constitutional structure allows judicial decisions to create an unfair presumption against 
certain views, this problem would survive even if the Court were to embrace the 
Symposiasts’ position on the contested questions.  Judicial decisions that legislatures 
must protect fetal life, allow schools to organize prayers and tolerate private 
discrimination against homosexuals would place the Symposiasts’ political opponents in 
a position similar to their own.  Their opponents would have to overcome serious 
obstacles in order to use the political process to advance their understanding of 
constitutional values, and they would in all likelihood experience the sense of 
disenfranchisement expressed by the Symposiasts. 
This is not to say that the Symposiasts should embrace the structural claim.  We 
do not know whether an institutional structure without judicial review will be more stable 
70
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than one that assigns judges this authority.  It might be the case that similar presumptions 
are created when elected institutions have greater authority to set the status quo meaning 
of the Constitution.  Moreover, there are other considerations of both institutional design 
and substantive justice that will determine whether a political community is stable.  And 
even if we were endorse the structural claim that an institutional structure without judicial 
review is more stable, considerations of substantive justice might lead us to risk the 
added instability.  
 It would be odd, for example, if the Symposiasts would be content with a victory 
against judicial activism in a community that would vote overwhelming to support 
abortion rights, gay rights, and to exclude religion from the public sphere.   One would 
hope that everyone can agree that there is a threshold at which procedural justice cannot 
justify violations of substantive justice, even if we do not agree where it is.  And we 
should also be able to agree that structural claims have weight before we cross this 
threshold, even if we cannot agree on the weight they should have.  
This essay only contends that it is difficult to gauge—or even consider—the 
weight of structural claims like those suggested by the Symposiasts, because they are so 
closely linked to the doctrinal claims that animate the attack on judicial activism.  
Nonetheless, constitutional theorists have long recognized this vice in our constitutional 
structure: a Court empowered with judicial review will resolve some issues prematurely 
and, in the process, undercut the political position of citizens whose views the Court 
disfavors.   
The last point bears repeating: the Symposiasts’ structural claim is deeply rooted 
in the debates of constitutional theory.  Then why would theorists have so much trouble 
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assessing whether the structural claim has weight that is independent of the doctrinal 
claims with which it is entangled?  One reason is that such claims are usually asserted to 
support doctrinal claims, and doctrinal claims tend to have greater salience.  In those 
circumstances where theorists debate constitutional process, questions of substance lurk 
in the background much as we saw when we considered the first interpretation of the 
Symposiasts’ structural claim. 
Consider first how Robert Cover illustrates what he calls the Court’s 
“jurispathic”72 function through a critical analysis of Bob Jones.73 The Court, according 
to Cover, must favor some understandings of community values over others, when it says 
what the law is.  In so doing, it kills the understandings not chosen as well as the 
community practices that are affiliated with those understandings.74 Consider as well 
Bickel’s use of Brown to illustrate the “passive virtues.”75 He believes the Court must 
avoid legitimating controversial practices in the name of the Constitution or risk 
introducing great instability to the political community.76 The Court’s decision to delay 
remedy in Brown II,77 allowed the debate about desegregation to continue without the 
Court creating too great a presumption for the interpretation it favored.78 Bickel contrasts 
Brown with Plessy,79 where the Court mistakenly legitimated the practice of segregation, 
and Scott v. Sanford,80 where it mistakenly legitimated slavery.81 
72Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 TERM: Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV 
4, 40 (1983.) 
73
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74See Cover, supra note 72 at 40-41.
75 See BICKEL, supra note 30 at 111-98.
76 Id. at 199-207.
77349 U.S. 294 (1955.) 
78See BICKEL, supra note 30, at 244-72. 
79163 U.S. 537 (1896.)
80
 60 U.S. (19 How) 393 (1857).
81See BICKEL, supra note 30, at 71, 76, 197 65-68 and 259-63. 
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Now consider two older examples: John Calhoun defends nullification in the 
context of a dispute over tariffs and with the broader question of slavery in the immediate 
background.82 He believes that this power ensures that a national majority does not 
impose a view of the Constitution on a local majority.83 The anti-federalist, Brutus, 
makes the same argument from the reverse side when he attacks judicial review, because 
the power would ensure that the national majority will determine the meaning of the 
Constitution and would be biased toward the expansion of national authority.84 His 
argument differs from the others in that it arises in a context in which the debate about 
constitutional doctrine is a debate about what process to create.  Brutus’s attention to the 
nature of judicial power, however, does not appear to go beyond his interest in limiting a 
potential leviathan, although the argument is remarkably sensitive to how judicial 
authority tends to delegitimate the views of disappointed interests.   
We see again that the difficulty in assigning independent weight to structural 
claims is magnified by the different ways that considerations of structure intersect with 
considerations of doctrine.  The first three examples illustrate how structural claims 
become linked, and I would argue obscured, by more salient doctrinal claims.   
The fourth example reveals how doctrinal considerations will creep into our 
consideration of what appears to be a purely structural question; Brutus’ claim is like (3), 
though it is not clear the extent it is driven by considerations of doctrine.  He suggests 
that federal authority will not respond sufficiently to local conceptions of constitutional 
82
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values and thus will be experienced as tyranny at the local level.85 It might be that Brutus 
recognizes that federal answers to particular questions of constitutional values will be in 
conflict with the local understandings of those values—this is my interpretation of 
Calhoun—and this argument is parallel to my interpretation of the Symposiasts’ claim 
that looks to the substance of judicial decisions to determine whether religious interests 
are well represented.  
But Brutus’s can also be interpreted in a manner that gives the structural aspect 
somewhat greater emphasis.  He might be claiming that the distance of the federal 
judiciary from the people of the states ensures such conflicts will arise; although Brutus 
might not have particular controversies in mind, he can imagine some conflicts in which 
local values should triumph but don’t.  In this second case, the procedural claim implies a 
substantive understanding in the same way as Ely’s argument that judicial authority is 
well structured to promote democratic86 government implied a substantive argument 
about the significance of such governments.87 Both interpretations, however, invite 
consideration of doctrinal issues, and these issues make it harder to identify the more 
purely structural claim, that the judiciary, as an institution, will encourage a sense of 
disenfranchisement among some citizens no matter how it decides cases. 
It is not surprising that in their criticism of judicial activism the Symposiasts 
identify an argument that would attack expansive judicial authority of the type endorsed 
by Dworkin.  But the structural claim we identified would extend to any justification of 
judicial review, including those the Symposiasts might endorse, and that is why it is hard 
85Id. 
86 Such substantive claims were no doubt present in the other claims as well.  Cover, for example, was more 
interested in interests like those of Bob Jones University then in the outcome of that particular case.  And 
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to grasp the structural aspects of their argument.  Indeed, the Symposiasts view judicial 
authority from the doctrinal perspective that characterizes Dworkin’s argument.  They 
seek to advance an understanding of constitutional doctrine that follows from their 
particular conception of substantive justice.  Therefore, they emphasize claims that are 
analogous to (1) and (2), and, like Dworkin, the doctrinal aspect of their third claim 
swamps the structural argument.   
In the remainder of the section, we examine another consequence of the doctrinal 
orientation that characterizes the arguments of the Symposiasts and Dworkin.  Given 
their focus on the values judges identify, they treat the judiciary’s role in resolving 
controversies as a step in the broader political process that identifies community values, 
rather than as a distinct role.  Therefore, they fail to recognize the tension between the 
two roles we expect judges to perform.  Their arguments reflect the ascendant paradigm 
in constitutional theory, a paradigm in which theorists attempt to assess judicial 
discretion in the process that identifies constitutional values.  The section concludes by 
tracing the tension back to Bickel, in many ways the fountainhead of this paradigm.88 
B. The Doctrinal Orientation and the Tension Between Structural Claims 
So far, we have seen how the doctrinal aspects of a claim like (3) can obscure its 
structural aspects, but we have only considered structural claims relating to the process 
that identifies constitutional values. But the structural claims we associated with 
Dworkin and the Symposiasts could also be interpreted in a manner that gives greater 
although Bickel and Calhoun were more interested in particular doctrinal outcomes, their views both 
suggest deeper assumptions about substantive justice.  
87 See Tribe, supra note 45.
88 See, supra note 32.
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emphasis to the judicary’s role in resolving controversies.  Consider again Dworkin’s 
claim (3).  Integrity seems to be a virtue that characterizes the Court’s resolution of 
controversies.  A well ordered judicial process would ensure that all citizens receive the 
benefit of having the community’s legal principles applied to their cases.   
Nonetheless, Dworkin believes that judges do more than resolve controversies 
based on pre-existing legal principles.  He expects judges to interpret these principles in 
light of the considerations of justice that are manifest in the political community’s past 
practices, considerations that would not be obvious to the parties or to citizens more 
generally.89 Judges, according to Dworkin, should perform a quasi-legislative function; 
they are to decide cases in a manner that advances the ideal of justice that underlies the 
community’s principles.90 Recall why Dworkin defends an expansive conception of 
judicial review.  He believes that the judiciary is well suited to advance our deliberations 
about the understanding of equality that informs important principles of constitutional 
law.91 In so doing, he assumes there is no tension between the Court’s role in resolving 
controversies and its role in identifying constitutional values; the Court is well suited to 
resolve controversies because it advances our understanding of the values our
constitutional principles entail.  
The tension between these roles is implicit in the Symposiasts’ structural claim.  It 
is not evident in the two interpretations we have previously examined, however, because 
those interpretations focus on the process that identifies constitutional values as opposed 
to the process that resolves controversies.  The Symposiasts, for example, might expect 
judges to advance Dworkin’s understanding of justice, but would view this as a reason to 
89 See DWORKIN, supra note 6 at 93.
90 See Id.
35
curtail judicial review; they would contend that Dworkin’s understanding does not reflect 
the views of religious citizens.92 They might also expect instability to arise from an 
institutional structure that excludes the views of religious citizens from the process that 
identifies community values.93 
But we can interpret the Symposiasts structural claim in light of the role judges 
play in resolving particular controversies.  Their concern about delegitimization suggests 
a third criticism that can be applied to Dworkin’s argument or any argument that justifies 
judges having discretionary authority to identify community values.  Citizens, according 
to this interpretation, are less likely to accept the decisions of judges who they believe to 
be hostile to their views, even as those decisions apply to immediate cases.  This criticism 
differs from the others in that it asks whether the Court is the proper institution to resolve 
particular controversies.  The Symposiasts do not consider this argument seriously, 
because they are concerned about constitutional doctrine.   
This orientation leads them, like Dworkin, to collapse the distinction between the 
process that resolves controversies and the process that identifies community values, and 
thus makes them less likely to consider whether the institution of the judiciary is well 
suited to resolve particular controversies.  The Symposiasts treat the Court’s decisions as 
instances in an ongoing process that identifies constitutional values.  They appeal to the 
idea that although elected institutions must accept Court authority to resolve particular 
cases, these institutions have authority to interpret the Constitution independently as they 
exercise their own authority.94 They trace this argument to Abraham’s Lincoln’s 
91 See DWORKIN, supra note 7 at 34.
92See supra note 65.
93 Id.
94See Arkes, supra note 69 at 80. 
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justification for resisting Dred Scott.  According to this view, the Court’s interpretation of 
the Constitution is final for the parties but the political debate about what the Constitution 
means continues.95  Although this implies a claim about the authority institutions should 
have in identifying constitutional values,96 it is primarily a rhetorical justification that 
girds a substantive challenge to the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution.  
Because the Symposiasts consider the Court’s identification of constitutional 
values as part of an ongoing process, they do not examine the tension between the 
Court’s role in resolving particular controversies and its role in identifying such values.  
Notwithstanding their strong views about constitutional doctrine, the Symposiasts’
criticism of the Court has little to do with how disappointed litigants might respond to the 
Court and everything to do with how the Court’s decisions influenced subsequent debates 
about constitutional values.  The claim that the Court disenfranchises certain views would 
lose much traction, if we knew that the parties who lost those cases would suffer no 
disadvantage in future conflicts about what the Constitution means. 
The Symposiasts do not consider the Court a fair arbiter of constitutional 
controversies as a consequence of the role it has played in identifying constitutional 
values.  But they do not examine the ramifications of this judgment, because their 
argument treats the resolution of particular controversies as only a step in the process that 
identifies constitutional values rather than as a distinct process.  This tendency is even 
more pronounced among the many constitutional theorists who, like Dworkin, defend
95Id., at 45, 55-62; Bork, supra note 66 at 17 “Our Judicial Oligarchy;” 17; The Editors of First Things, 
supra note 66 at 119-20; Russell Hittinger, Government By the ‘Thoughtful Part;’ Robert P. George, 
Justice, Legitimacy and Allegiance, in THE END OF DEMOCRACY II: A CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY 22-
23, 34- 35 and 102-03 (Mitchell S. Muncy ed.,1999.) 
96 And to the extent it makes the claim that elected institutions should resolve ambiguous constitutional 
provisions, it does so based on the expectation that they will reach better decisions.  See Gary D. Glenn, 
The Venerable Argument Against Judicial Usurpation; George W. Carey, The Philadelphia Constitution: 
37
judicial activism and try to guide the Court’s identification of constitutional values.  
Because these theorists begin with the assumption that judges will have considerable 
discretion in deciding cases, they are even less likely to consider whether the Court’s role 
in identifying constitutional values undercuts its ability to resolve controversies.  
Consider again Bickel’s justification of judicial review, a model for two 
generations of constitutional theorists.  He believes that judicial review can be justified, 
notwithstanding its counter-majoritarian character, because the Court’s authority is 
tempered by other political forces that determine whether the Court is successful in 
advancing its understanding of constitutional values.97 Bickel too uses Lincoln’s attack 
on Dred Scott to illustrate that judicial decisions are one moment in an ongoing  political 
fight over constitutional values.98 He believes that the efficacy of the Court’s attempts to 
say what the Constitution means depends on how elected institutions and citizens, more 
generally, respond to the Court’s interpretations of constitutional principles.99  It is this 
dependency that leads Bickel to emphasize the importance of the passive virtues.   
The Court, according to Bickel, should employ the passive virtues to delay 
making final determinations about what the Constitution means until it has had time to 
secure the consent of elected institutions and the broader public.100 The passive virtues
are various discretionary devices, such as the requirements that a case present a live 
controversy, that is ripe, and not a political question.101  Bickel describes them as 
techniques and devices that allow the Court to resolve controversies without rendering a 
Dead or Alive, in THE END OF DEMOCRACY II: A CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY 110-112, and 
235(Mitchell S. Muncy ed., 1999.) 
97See BICKEL supra note 30. 
98 Id. at 65-70.
99 Id.
100 See supra notes 75-81.
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decision on constitutional grounds and thus do not require the Court to legitimate social 
practices in the name of the Constitution.102
Bickel, as we have seen, is concerned by the instability that results when the
Court prematurely legitimates controversial social practices in the name of the 
Constitution,103 and he commends the passive virtues as means to avoid this outcome.104
He also illustrates how the Court can use the passive virtues to suspend the application of 
constitutional principles until a later time by which it can convince people that its 
understanding of constitutional values is the correct one.105  Bickel recognizes that the 
Court brings considerable prestige to the endeavor.  He describes the Court’s ability “to 
concretize the symbol of the Constitution” and suggests that people are more likely to 
embrace political practices the Court deems constitutional—or even not 
unconstitutional—because they accept the Court’s authority to speak in the name of the 
Constitution.106
Bickel believes that the Court can perform the function he identifies without being 
perceived as an instrument of partisan ideology; the Court can sustain its prestige.107  But 
it would seem that the Court’s prestige will diminish as soon as it ventures beyond the 
consensus understanding of constitutional values and tries to influence our disagreements 
about what the Constitution means.  We have already seen how the Court’s prestige and 
its position in the institutional structure can create fairly strong presumptions against 
101
 See Christopher J. Peters and Neal Devins, Alexander Bickel and the New Judicial Minimalism in THE 
JUDICIARY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 47-51 (Kenneth D. Ward and Cecilia R. Castillo eds., 
2005.)
102 See BICKEL supra note 30, at 70-72.
103 See supra, note 81. 
104 See supra, note 76.
105 See BICKEL supra note 30, at 111-98.
106 Id., at 29-33, 129-32.  He calls this the “Mystic Function.” 
107 Id., at 236-45.
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views it rejects.  The people who hold these views will feel disenfranchised by the 
Court’s actions and resentful towards the Court.  
Bickel recognizes this as a problem the Court must face if it is to maintain its 
position in the process that identifies constitutional values.108 He illustrates how the Court 
sustained its authority against the significant challenge it faced after the Brown
decision.109 Bickel describes the initial success of the political movement that mobilized 
against desegregation and how this movement failed once it was perceived to be engaged 
in mob violence rather than passive resistance to the Court.110 People came to embrace 
the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution and rejected the alternative put forth by its 
opponents.111 Bickel, however, does not address whether the Court’s success affected its 
ability to resolve controversies.   
The Court became the enemy of those who lost the fight over constitutional 
doctrine.112  It seems likely that this had repercussions for judicial efforts to resolve future 
controversies, especially those involving the implementation of newly ascendant anti-
discrimination norms.113 It would be surprising if this hostility toward the judiciary did 
not lead people to resist its authority and thus prolong or exacerbate controversies that 
could have been settled more efficiently or peacefully, if judges were not perceived as 
interested parties in active pursuit of an ideological agenda.    
Moreover, it is likely that judges’ participation in the process that identifies 
community values will have subtle effects on the institution of the judiciary, effects that 
will influence the Court’s ability to resolve  controversies.  Justice Scalia, for example, 
108 Id., at 65-72
109 Id., at 244-72.   
110 Id., at 255-56.
111 Id., at 271.
112 Id.
113See e.g., GERALD ROSENBURG, THE HOLLOW HOPE ___ (199_) 
40
has noted that once people recognize the role judges play in the process that identifies 
constitutional values, they will demand that the people chosen to be judges will reflect 
their views.114 And we would expect that citizens who believe themselves 
disenfranchised by an ideological court are more likely to take an interest in future 
appointments.  Therefore, it is not surprising that the  Court’s attempts to redefine 
constitutional values in Brown and other cases have led to a more politicized nomination 
process.115  It would be surprising, however, if an increasingly political appointment 
process did not have some influence on how the judiciary, as an institution, views 
particular cases.
Scalia, for example, describes a Sixth Amendment case in which the Court makes 
an exception to the confrontation clause in order to ensure that the victim of a child 
molester was spared the trauma of facing her attacker without increasing the chances of 
the attacker’s acquittal.116  He contends that rights lose their significance, when judges 
interpret them in light of political pressure they might experience.117  But we should also 
expect that judges appointed to advance longer term doctrinal goals would be less 
responsive to the interests of the parties, even if they were to experience no immediate 
political pressure.  
114 See SCALIA, supra note 47, at 46. 
115See MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES: THE NEW POLITICS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT CONFIRMATIONS (1994); DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: 
PRESIDENTIALPOLITICS ANF THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES, (1999)  
Bickel would not necessarily disagree.  He became increasingly skeptical of judicial review as he witnessed 
the excesses of the Warren Court.   People, according to Bickel, perceived the Justices as ideologically 
driven and, what is more, lost faith in the consensus of values embodied in the symbol of the Court.  He 
associates the chaos of the Vietnam War/Watergate Era with this breakdown, the main symptoms being a 
total disrespect for authority and the rise of a form of popular politics in which demagogues attempt to 
advance particular views in the name of the people. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF 
CONSENT 120-23 (1975); BORK supra note 47, at  131-32, 193. 
116 See SCALIA, supra note 47, at 46-47.
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Indeed, Bickel’s description of how judges should exercise their authority 
illustrates how an ideological Court will be less responsive to the immediate interests of 
litigants.  Because he views judicial decisions as part of the process that identifies 
constitutional values, Bickel does not consider adequately how the Court’s interest in 
shaping constitutional doctrine affects its ability to do justice in particular cases.  Consider 
again the passive virtues.  The Court might use the passive virtues to avoid a constitutional 
judgment that it believes the society is not ready to endorse.  In so doing, it would deny 
one of the parties a judgment to which they are entitled.118  For example, Bickel discusses 
the cost to people who suffered harm because the Court did not decide the 
constitutionality of restrictions that the state of Connecticut placed on birth control.119  He 
believes that costs such as these are acceptable given the role the Court is to play in 
identifying constitutional values, but this seems to beg the question as to whether the 
Court should perform a function that is at odds with another important function it 
performs.120
Similarly, Bickel’s discussion of Brown does not address the costs the Court 
imposed on a generation of African-Americans by delaying its remedy to the injustice of 
segregation.  On the one hand, the Court’s decision in Brown II is a concession to a 
political environment in which there was little chance that the South would desegregate its 
schools peacefully; justice, in all likelihood, would have been denied even if the Court had 
insisted on immediate integration.  On the other hand, Bickel recognizes that the Court 
could have found the schools in violation of the principle of separate but equal, the law 
118
 Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the ‘Passive Virtues’: A Comment of Principle and Expediency in 
Judicial Review, 64 COL. L. REV. 1(1964).
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prior to Brown.121  In so doing, the Court would have been in a better position to remedy 
the violation, whether by insisting that African-American students receive a greater share 
of educational resources or perhaps even by requiring desegregation until adequate 
facilities were provided.122
While there would have been resistance to these rulings as well, they would have 
at least secured more for the parties, especially if the Justices were perceived as respecting 
the values that supported the regime.  Perhaps these gains would not have been great, but 
the alternative was to subordinate people’s interests to a longer term doctrinal goal.  
Bickel does not acknowledge that the Court’s role in identifying constitutional values is in 
tension with its role in resolving a particular controversy.  Rather than secure plaintiffs 
benefits to which they were entitled under the law, the Court pursued a new understanding 
of constitutional values that might—or might not—yield gains for similarly situated 
people at some undetermined time in the future.   
IV.  Conclusion 
 We have seen that structural claims are easily obscured by the doctrinal questions 
that often frame debates in constitutional theory.   The remainder of this essay considers 
how such claims might influence these debates. 
 To begin, it is worth repeating that our interest in justice must at some point trump 
any concern for the institutional structures we use to pursue justice.  We would not want 
to sever our assessment of judicial authority from any expectation of how judges should 
121 Id., at 171.
122Id., Bickel notes that prior to Brown the Court pursued such a strategy in the area of higher education.  
The Justices were careful not to reaffirm the Plessy principle and were perceived as undermining it, and 
this suggests that he views these decisions as consistent with his understanding of the proper use for the 
passive virtues.     
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decide cases.  People do not have an obligation to obey governments whose policies fall 
below some threshold of justice and would be justified in resisting particular injustices 
advanced by such governments.  Defining the duties citizens have when their government 
pursues policies in tension with important requirements of justice is a problem of political 
theory, however. 
Constitutional theory addresses a related problem: the best institutional 
arrangement for pursuing justice.  In considering which arrangements are best, we have 
to recognize that these institutions must also manage people’s disagreements about 
justice.   Structural claims speak to this problem.  Our assessment of their significance 
will depend both on how we view justice and view our disagreements about justice.  
Structural claims should become less important the greater our confidence that 
governmental institutions can identify and enforce norms of justice, and scholars with 
strong views of what constitutional doctrine should be will likely assign less weight to 
these claims.  Indeed, we saw that the structural claims made by both Dworkin and the 
Symposiasts did little more than complement doctrinal claims that were the core of their 
arguments.  
Structural claims have greater significance when we believe that government 
institutions will not be able to resolve our disagreements about the values that should 
govern people’s lives.  In such conditions, we have greater interest in how institutions go 
about making decisions.  We saw, for example, that the fact of disagreement adds weight 
to the Symposiasts’ claim that judicial authority disenfranchises certain views.  Although 
the Symposiasts seem particularly concerned with how disenfranchisement undercuts the 
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quest for justice, they also suggest that instability arises when people believe that judges 
have created an unfair presumption against such views.   
Note well, however, that the essay only contends that constitutional theory is 
characterized by a doctrinal orientation that makes it difficult to identify claims of this 
type; the essay does not defend the claim or assess its significance.  The consideration of 
specific structural claims is best saved for another day.123 We will instead consider some 
implications that our analysis of structural claims has for debates in constitutional theory 
more generally.   
The case for expansive judicial authority to identify constitutional values appears 
weaker if we seek a process that will manage our disagreements about justice rather than 
resolve them.  The legislative process tends to be better suited to respect disagreement.124 
Legislatures typically have incentives to define policies that accommodate diverse 
interests.  The American legislative system, with its abundance of minority vetoes, is 
particularly well suited to represent minority views and thus ensure that any significant 
piece of legislation has super-majority support.  The judiciary, by contrast, is designed to 
increase the chances that judges will decide cases correctly.  Because judges have to 
decide for one party or the other—they have less opportunity than legislators do to 
123 Nonetheless, our recent experience of judicial activism suggests its plausibility.  The Symposium itself 
is part of a highly partisan struggle to control the courts, a struggle that seems to push our politics towards 
greater ideological polarization.  Scholars once attributed the stability of American constitutionalism to the 
consensus of values at its foundation.  Indeed, Bickel thought that such a consensus made judicial review 
possible and that the Court served as its guardian.  See BICKEL supra note 30, at 30.   See also, LOUIS 
HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA, (1955); And although we can debate whether this 
was ever an accurate description of American politics, it is certain that the fissures in the foundation of 
American constitutionalism have created greatest stress in periods characterized by judicial activism.   
To establish judicial authority as the source of the stress, we would have to determine whether judicial 
review creates the presumption that has been hypothesized, whether judicial decisions actually have the 
effect of delegitimizing opposing views of constitutional values such that citizens who hold these views are 
disadvantaged in the ongoing debate about what the Constitution means.  We might, for example, compare 
how citizens respond to the exercise of different types of institutional authority and examine whether 
legislative decisions are more easily overturned than judicial decisions. 
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compromise and accommodate—there is a greater urgency for good decisions.  And the 
design of the judiciary reflects this need.   
Judges are given independence to isolate them from political pressures.  They 
tend to be highly educated and apply their training to evidence that is revealed through a 
process that has been finely calibrated to increase the chances of a correct decision.  It is 
not surprising then, that many arguments for expansive judicial authority have 
emphasized how the judiciary is well suited to identify important constitutional values 
that the legislative process often ignores.  People, who believe that they have special 
insight into justice or particular confidence in the understanding of justice that they hold, 
are more likely to have faith in an elite judiciary, a judiciary that may one day be 
populated by judges like themselves.   
On the other hand, the judiciary’s exalted status can become a vice in a 
community characterized by deep disagreements about justice.  In such a community, 
partisan elites would seek to control judges in order to gain a presumption favoring their 
particular interpretation of the Constitution, and, in so doing, they would inflame the 
controversies that manifest the underlying disagreements about justice.  Consequently, 
we would have reason to favor the stability achieved by an institutional structure that is 
more likely to leave unresolved divisive questions of constitutional interpretation,  
But we cannot manage our disagreements without resolving the particular 
controversies that implicate broader questions of justice, and we expect that judges often 
will resolve these controversies.  That is why (a) the judicial process is designed to 
maximize the likelihood of good decisions and (b) judges have less flexibility to 
compromise and accommodate.  In addition, some of the virtues that scholars claim 
124 See WALDRON, supra note 38. 
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support the authority of judicial review lend themselves to the function of resolving short 
term controversies.  Consider again Dworkin’s claim about integrity or Macedo’s about 
reasonability.  Judges promote social stability when their decisions resolve controversies 
with finality, and citizens more readily can accept the authority of decisions that are well 
reasoned and that treat like cases alike.  I suspect that scholars in search of a justification 
for expanding judicial power have assumed that the qualities that make judges good at 
resolving particular controversies can be applied to our broader disagreements about 
justice.  We have seen, however, that expanding such authority risks changing the 
institution in ways that will render it less adept at resolving those controversies.    
Lastly, structural claims should influence how we approach questions of judicial 
authority, even if they do not lend themselves to the particular conclusions discussed 
above.  Constitutional theorists are too readily drawn into doctrinal battles of 
constitutional politics.125 Our scholarly resources are spent declaring and justifying 
landmark decisions, rather than examining the consequences of competing institutional 
structures.       
More significantly, most constitutional theorists have training in law or political 
science, training that lends itself to questions of how institutions operate and the effects 
institutions have rather than to speculations about justice. And though scholars have paid 
increasing attention to the effects of different institutional structures, they have tended to 
treat institutions as independent variables that might explain the dependent variable, 
constitutional doctrine.  They have paid comparatively little attention to the role these 
institutions might play in managing society’s disagreements.  This deficiency becomes 
125
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especially troubling, if our disagreements about justice run so deep as to survive any 
political settlement.   
What is more, constitutional theory might very well advance a discussion of how 
to go about addressing disagreements about justice, even though the disagreements 
themselves are beyond its effective resolution.  It might be possible to build a scholarly 
consensus about questions of constitutional structure, because such questions are at least 
one step removed from the substantive disagreements that animate political controversies.  
Dworkin, for example, will more likely accept the claim that the judicial institution 
creates presumptions prematurely than he will the claim that judges should not guarantee 
women’s right to choose to have an abortion.   
Even if we cannot agree on the constitutional structure that best addresses our 
disagreements about justice, it is quite possible to achieve a consensus about the likely 
consequences that follow from using certain institutional structures to resolve these 
disagreements. The Symposiasts will continue to recognize that judicial review creates an 
undue presumption in favor of certain views, even if the Court were to reverse the 
decisions that they believe have disenfranchised religious views.  And in the event of a 
rebirth of conservative activism, Dworkin would as well.  In such a case, Dworkin and 
the Symposiasts would disagree about the justice of the new decisions.  They might agree 
about the role the Court should play in identifying constitutional values, even though 
their disagreements about justice or other structural considerations will weigh against 
their meeting of the minds.  They would agree, however, that a Court empowered with 
judicial review is prone to create too great a presumption against certain understandings 
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of constitutional values.  At a minimum, structural claims allow us to better understand 
the depth and subtleties of our disagreements.      
 
